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Abstract: This research design creates a framework in which the risk preferences 
and Islamic religiosity of Jordanian borrowers can be estimated. Specifically, this 
study highlights the different characteristics of conventional and Islamic 
microfinance borrowers. Although there is extensive literature on the topics of 
conventional microfinance and Islamic finance individually, few studies 
characterize borrowers who choose between these financial products. For this 
study, field research was conducted in conjunction with the National 
Microfinance Bank (NMB) and the Development and Employment Fund (DEF) 
in Jordan. Overall, 143 conventional and 78 Islamic borrowers were surveyed for 
a total sample of 221 borrowers. To estimate the determinants of taking up an 
Islamic microfinance loan, a linear probability model is utilized. Moreover, to 
create an index for measuring risk preferences and religiosity, both principal 
component analysis and summary index are used. Theories behind Islamic 
microfinance inherently suggest that it will appeal to risk-averse and more 
religious individuals. Contrary to theoretical propositions, the results indicate 
that Islamic borrowers tend to have risk-seeking preferences. The results also 
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1. Introduction 
Since its inception in the early 1980s, microfinance has been widely acclaimed as a 
paradigm for poverty alleviation in addition to enhancing economic and social development in 
developing countries. As a result, microfinance has rapidly spread to many regions of the world 
as a potential solution for poverty. One of the most recent areas to adopt microfinance practices 
is the Middle East, where there is a budding market for financial inclusion in the form of 
microfinance. Although it has only been implemented within the past two decades, microfinance 
has already reached millions of those living in poverty in the Middle East and North Africa.  
Despite the recent success of microfinance in the Middle East, many argue that outreach 
is not as effective as it could be and there is the potential to access more clients (Dhumale and 
Sapcanin, 1999, and Obaidullah, 2008). In Arab countries alone, the outreach gap is estimated 
to be approximately 53 million (Malkawi et al., 2011). Among other things, some authors argue 
that the reason for this disparity is a fundamental difference in the clientele that are taking up 
loans in the Middle East (National Impact Study, 2007). Essentially, many potential Middle 
Eastern clients practice Islam under Shari’a law, which specifically classifies riba, or interest, as 
prohibited in economic transactions (Obaidullah, 2008). Since interest is a main component of 
microfinance, several authors argue that many Middle Easterners living in poverty do not 
participate in credit programs (Abdul-Rahman, 2007, Dusuki, 2008). For this reason, these 
authors agree that the outreach of microfinance can be significantly more widespread in the 
region, and it has not reached its full potential (National Impact Study, 2007, Dhumale and 
Sapcanin, 1999, and Obaidullah, 2008). 
To adapt to the alternative preferences of Middle Eastern clientele, Islamic microfinance 
has been suggested as a remedy (Havel, 2007). Rather than use interest rates as a form of 
revenue in Islamic microfinance, the borrowers and the sellers of the transaction jointly share 
risks and profits in a project. In addition, the principles of Islamic microfinance vary from those 
of conventional microfinance, as they follow the philosophy of Islamic law. Primarily, Islamic 
microfinance is based on social welfare and justice, fixed prepayment rates, transparency, and 
risk and profit sharing (IFAD, 2012). Islamic microfinance has consequently been described as 
an asset-based approach instead of a debt-based approach, like conventional microfinance. 
Though there are several types of contracts inherent within Islamic microfinance, the 
overarching goal is that of profit and loss sharing and creating an equity-oriented environment 
that facilitates participation and frowns upon speculation and moral hazard (Seibel, 2006).  
Both conventional and Islamic microfinance are well-developed fields of study within 
development economics; however, limited research has characterized borrowers who choose 
	   2 
between these two financial products. Whether these programs lack regulatory support or 
simply lack popular demand, it is clear that a more methodical study of Islamic microfinance 
will greatly contribute to current literature. Through this study, it is possible to understand 
what type of client desires the availability of Islamic microfinance. While few studies have 
distinctly characterized Islamic microfinance clients due to its novelty, the fundamental aspects 
of this type of financing suggest certain attributes. Mainly, because Islamic microfinance offers 
a risk-sharing alternative to conventional microfinance, several authors posit that Islamic 
microfinance will attract risk-averse individuals (IFAD, 2012, Abdul Rahman, 2007 and 
Dusuki, 2008). Moreover, because Islamic microfinance contracts do not charge interest on 
loans and the basic appeal of Islamic finance is to attract religious individuals, it can be argued 
that Islamic microfinance will appeal to more religious individuals. To properly investigate 
these hypotheses, this research takes advantage of the unique microfinance market in Jordan 
where both conventional and Islamic microfinance loans are available. Using this information, 
it is possible to explore the differences between these two types of borrowers. Specifically, this 
study addresses whether conventional microfinance borrowers are more risk-loving than 
Islamic borrowers, and whether Islamic microfinance borrowers are more religious than 
conventional borrowers. 
This research was carried out between two microfinance institutions at a total of nine 
branches throughout Jordan. Overall, the sample consists of 221 participants with 143 
conventional borrowers and 78 Islamic borrowers. Each borrower was randomly selected to 
participate in a survey either in person or on the phone. The survey included questions 
regarding basic demographics, in addition to questions aimed at eliciting risk preferences and 
Islamic religiosity. For instance, a set of questions explore an individual’s risk preference in the 
context of personal life, business decisions, relationships with others, and entrepreneurial 
decision-making. In addition, several questions addressed various features of religiosity. In 
order to develop a set of questions that accurately captured overall religiosity, this section of 
the survey was developed during the preliminary period in Jordan. Each question was 
thoughtfully created through the help of focus groups, native Jordanians, enumerators, and 
bank employees. Ultimately, these questions emphasize the role of religion in daily life, the 
extent to which individuals practice religion, and overall sentiments towards financial products, 
including microfinance loans. 
The results of this research indicate that some important factors influence the take-up of 
Islamic versus conventional microfinance loans. Primarily, the results indicate that higher 
levels of Islamic religiosity increase the probability of taking up an Islamic microfinance loan 
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by approximately 20 percentage points. This conclusion holds when controlling for various 
factors, including time preference, branch location, whether the survey was conducted in 
Ramadan, and the size of the loan. On the contrary, the results for risk preferences are more 
sensitive to specification. Although the coefficients are all positive and some have significance, 
this result varies according to how the model is specified. In general, the results indicate that 
risk-loving borrowers are more likely to take out Islamic loans. In addition to religiosity and 
risk preferences, the estimations show that conventional loans are primarily comprised of 
female borrowers. In other words, men are considerably more likely to participate in Islamic 
microfinance, and therefore increase the probability of taking up an Islamic microfinance loan. 
Similarly, Islamic borrowers tend to have larger loan sizes than conventional borrowers. There 
are also high levels of significance on the dummy variables for a phone interview as well as if 
the survey was conducted in Ramadan. Although these results are potentially due to the fact 
that the majority of Islamic borrowers were surveyed on the phone and almost all the Islamic 
borrower surveys were conducted in Ramadan, the previously mentioned findings hold when 
controlling for these two factors.  
The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner: Section 2 presents the 
literature review, Section 3 provides a description of the sample and data collection, Section 4 
presents the empirical model for this research, Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6 
provides a discussion of the results.  
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Risk Preferences and Decision-Making 
A significant portion of this research is dedicated to estimating the risk preferences of 
Islamic microfinance borrowers. Previously, the poor and their decisions in the face of risk have 
garnered much attention in economics literature. In developing countries, risk is widespread 
primarily due to the potential for frequent, unpredictable shocks, and the inability of the poor to 
provide insurance against these shocks (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007). Theoretically, Islamic 
microfinance is identified as a model inherently tailored to risk-averse individuals. This is 
because in Islamic microfinance contracts, the borrower engages in a profit and loss sharing 
contract with the microfinance institution (MFI). In other words, when undertaking a contract 
with a borrower, the MFI will bear a portion of the risk, providing the borrower with an 
opportunity that is less risky overall. 
First, it is important to examine the behavior of individuals when faced with “safe” and 
“risky” prospects. Economists have traditionally used the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) to 
analyze an individual’s actions when they are faced with a decision (Leiberman, 2011). Through 
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the use of probabilities, the EUT derives an individual’s utility when they espouse different risk 
preferences (Leiberman, 2011). Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) argue that with the EUT, 
rational decision-makers will select the payoff that offers the highest utility. In contrast, 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) hypothesize that the EUT is not an adequate representation of 
risk preferences, leading them to modify the EUT in order to incorporate loss aversion into the 
model. With these changes, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) developed prospect theory. In this 
theory, the initial stage of decision-making consists of deciding on a particular point in which 
people consider anything higher as a gain and anything lower as a loss (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979). In the next phase, decision-makers evaluate utility according to the respective 
probabilities of potential outcomes, taking both gains and losses into account. The authors 
highlight that people experience more discontent from losing a sum of money than pleasure in 
gaining an equivalent amount. Still, Leiberman (2011) argues that prospect theory is a 
simplified, incomplete, and an approximate description of risky prospects, though it “performs 
as a better evaluator of rationality” than the EUT.  
Moving towards risk preferences in the context of microcredit, Stiglitz (1990) 
introduced a model of ex ante moral hazard in microfinance. In the context of peer monitoring, 
Stiglitz’s model reveals that transferring risk to a cosigner improves a borrower’s overall 
welfare (Stiglitz, 1990). Akin to much of the theoretical work on microfinance, Stiglitz’s model 
assumes that safer projects have higher expected returns than riskier projects, leading people to 
prefer less risky projects. On the contrary, de Meza and Webb (1990) posit that realistically, 
risky projects have higher expected returns than safe projects. Consequently, they argue that 
expanding financial access enables borrowers to make risky investments in pursuit of higher 
incomes (Giné et al., 2006). In contrast, this research explores riskiness in the context of an 
individual’s risk preferences, as opposed to the project’s riskiness. 
Vereshchagina et al. (2009) further delve into this idea by exploring risk in the context 
of entrepreneurs. The authors develop a theory of endogenous entrepreneurial risk taking to 
observe the risk preferences of entrepreneurs (Vereshchagina et al., 2009,). Within their study, 
the authors find that poor entrepreneurs have a greater tendency to pursue relatively risky 
projects. Several other studies support this claim, postulating that entrepreneurs embody a set 
of preferences that encourages them to engage in riskier behavior. Some of these studies 
suggest that entrepreneurs are simply less risk averse than the rest of the population (Cressy, 
2000; Polkovnichenko, 2003; Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979), while other studies propose that 
entrepreneurs are overoptimistic and derive extra utility from being their own boss 
(Moskowitz et al., 2002). While these studies are applicable to microfinance in the sense that 
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borrowers are innately similar to entrepreneurs, they still present several disadvantages. 
Vereshchagina et al. (2009) do not take into account individual heterogeneity of preferences or 
beliefs. This is a key aspect that this study attempts to address by taking into account the 
different characteristics of borrowers, such as risk preferences and religiosity. Similarly, Cressy 
(2000) and Polkovnichenko (2003) suggest that entrepreneurs may be less risk averse because 
they have more human capital, or because they are wealthier. While this assumption may hold 
for entrepreneurs, it is not representative of microfinance borrowers in developing countries. 
In a related study, Pearlman (2012) deals specifically with risk and microfinance 
selection. By outlining a model involving the risk level of projects and a household’s ability to 
manage risk, the author determines that risk is significant in determining overall microfinance 
participation. In the context of this study, this idea would hold if Islamic and conventional 
borrowers had different risk preferences. Similar to choosing between conventional and Islamic 
microfinance, the microentrepreneurs have the opportunity to engage in a risky or safe 
enterprise within the model. Here, Pearlman (2011) attributes low microfinance penetration 
rates (or outreach) to a client’s vulnerability, or the difficulty of smoothing their consumption 
when faced with negative income shocks over time. In contrast to Pearlman’s conclusion, this 
research proposes that minimal outreach previously occurred due to a lack of diverse funding 
options available to borrowers. With the introduction of Islamic microfinance, however, credit 
rationing becomes less of an issue for borrowers and more financing options are available. 
2.2 Islamic Microfinance 
To understand why there may be differences between borrowers who take up 
conventional loans compared to Islamic loans, it is important to understand the difference 
between these two loan products. Islamic microfinance can be understood in the context of 
Islamic attitudes towards wealth distribution, ethics, and social and economic justice (Dhumale 
and Sapcanin, 1999). Contrary to conventional microfinance, Islamic finance is guided by 
certain Islamic objectives that circulate wealth to as many people as possible, ensuring that 
growth and equity promote justice and social welfare (Dusuki, 2008). Consequently, Islamic 
loan products are substantiated by Islamic code as well as Islamic principles. 
Four major principles guide Islamic financing methods, and subsequently play an 
important role in Islamic microfinance. The first of these principles is the prohibition of riba, or 
usury, in economic transactions. Several key passages in the Qur’an relate to financial 
regulation, and specifically to riba. In Sura 2, Verse 278-282, an English translation of the 
passage reads: “But God has permitted trading and made usury unlawful…God has laid his 
curse on usury and blessed almsgiving with increase,” (Qur’an, 2:275). The interpretation of 
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riba has been contested in practice, with some identifying it as exploitative or excessive interest 
rates, and others basing the definition on the concept of interest as a whole (Abdul Rahman, 
2007). Literally translated, riba refers to an excess, addition, expansion or growth, all of which 
are related to the practice of lending (Dhumale and Sapcanin, 1999). In addition to banning 
riba, another requirement of Islamic law is the prohibition of gharar. Gharar has been defined by 
Islamic scholars as implying uncertainty and deceit (Obaidullah, 2008). Though gharar is a 
broad concept, it is classified as a form of exposure that leads to uncertainty, deceit, fraud, or 
undue advantage in business transactions (Obaidullah, 2008). It is mainly associated with 
speculation and ambiguity in economic transactions. The next principle is the idea of risk 
sharing between the lender and the borrower. This idea promotes profit and loss sharing 
between the two during both positive and negative time periods (El-Komi and Croson, 2011). 
When the MFI becomes a co-owner of the business, it means that both the borrower and the 
lender have a strong interest in the success of the project (IFAD, 2012). Finally, the fourth 
principle of Islamic law specifies that money can solely be utilized as a medium of exchange, 
and cannot be used as an investment towards unproductive activities.  
Islamic microfinance models utilize three main contracts: the Mudaraba, the Musharaka, 
and the Murabaha contracts. These contracts have several things common: they are profit and 
risk sharing contracts that provide equitable sharing opportunities in microfinance, and of 
course, are compliant with Islamic code. In addition to banning riba and gharar, they encourage 
risk and profit sharing as well as ethical investments that promote social welfare (Jobst, 2007). 
Accordingly, the Mudaraba contract describes a partnership in which the financial institution 
invests capital and the client provides his labor and expertise. Here, profit is distributed 
according to a pre-determined ratio, with the micro entrepreneur “buying back” shares of 
capital with each loan installment that is repaid (Bhuiyan et al., 2011). When there is a loss, it is 
borne mainly by the investor in terms of money, while it is also borne by the borrower in terms 
of services (Saeed and Saqib, 2011). In contrast, the Musharaka contract describes an equity 
partnership contract between two partners where the parties share in the profits and losses 
according to predetermined ratios (Bhuiyan et al., 2011). As a result, it is considered to be the 
purest form of Islamic finance, and is most encouraged by scholars (Dhumale and Sapcanin, 
1999). In the last contract, the Murabaha contract, the financial institution purchases goods and 
resells them to the borrowers for the price of the goods plus a markup for administrative costs 
(Bhuiyan et al., 2011). For repayment, the borrower often pays back the price of the supplies in 
equal installments. According to Bhuiyan (2011), this model is the simplest for the borrowers 
to understand, and abridges loan administration as well as monitoring issues (Bhuiyan, 2011). 
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Likewise, Dhumale and Sapcanin (1998) conclude that this contract is advantageous to the 
Mudaraba model. The authors also argue that overall, the Murabaha model is more cost 
effective, provides immediate collateral for a MFI, and has a lower margin of error.  
Accordingly, the Murabaha model is the model that is most often used in practice, and is the 
contract employed by the Islamic borrowers in this study. 
While Islamic microfinance fundamentally differs from Western practices of finance, it 
also varies from traditional microfinance. Primarily, microfinance has not been as widespread in 
the Islamic world because it violates the basic principles of the Quran, because women are not 
as independent as in other regions, and because in the Islamic world, average incomes are 
generally greater than the poverty level (Obaidullah, 2008). Karim et al. (2008) suggest that 
about 72 percent of Muslims do not access formal financial services because it is interest-based, 
which is prohibited in Islamic Shari’a law. In contrast, Islamic microfinance is a synthesis 
between Islamic finance and conventional microfinance that is compliant with the basic 
principles of the Quran, that meets the needs of the poor by targeting families (not just 
women), and is an element of poverty alleviation that attempts to reduce social marginalization 
and poverty. In addition, Islamic MFIs take a different approach to default rates. The main 
theory outlines that a spirit of brotherhood and mutual help will encourage borrowers to repay 
their loans, especially because failure of repaying debt is considered unlawful in Islam (Ahmed, 
2002). For these reasons, Islamic microfinance has been presented as a viable alternative to 
conventional microfinance that can appeal to Middle Eastern populations.  
2.3 Islamic Microfinance and Outreach 
Although empirical research on Islamic microfinance is limited in scope, several studies 
have presented support for the fusion of Islamic products in the market. Dutta and Magableh 
(2006) investigate the socio-economic determinants of different stages in the borrowing process 
in Jordan. Utilizing a probit model, they measure the determinants of an individual taking up a 
conventional loan. They find that a respondent’s religious beliefs followed by lack of 
information on alternative sources of credit are the biggest barriers to pursuing microcredit 
(Dutta and Magableh, 2006). Similarly, in Syria, Karim et al. (2008) reveal that 43% of 
respondents cite religious reasons as a major obstacle to obtaining microfinance loans. 
Additionally, a survey conducted in the West Bank and Gaza Strip determined that 60% of low-
income individuals prefer Islamic products to conventional ones, even if they come at a higher 
price (Planet Finance, 2007).  
While many authors argue that Muslims do not participate in microfinance because of 
religious reasons, it is important to consider whether they would participate in microfinance at 
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all. Some authors argue that the moral and ethical values related to Islamic microfinance loans 
draw a larger client base that will have higher repayment rates as a result. Abdul Rahman 
(2007) argues that Islamic finance can play an important role in increasing the socioeconomic 
development of microentrepreneurs without charging riba. He asserts that the moral and 
religious attributes of Islamic finance successfully motivate microentrepreneurs; ensuring that 
the client will make regular payments, drawing new clients, and also helping them thrive. 
Additionally, Dusuki (2006) evaluates the idea of Islamic microfinance in terms of social 
solidarity with an emphasis on loyalty and group efforts over an individual’s self-interests. 
Arguing in favor of Islamic microfinance, he states that it can be supported through group 
lending to the poor who are generally denied access to conventional banking services (Dusuki, 
2006).  
Several studies outline the prospect for Islamic MFIs to have greater outreach in many 
Middle Eastern countries, specifically targeting the poorest of the poor. Primarily, Ahmed 
(2002) critically evaluates conventional microfinance, presenting Islamic microfinance as an 
alternative model. Combining a theoretical basis, the groundwork for an operational framework 
and case studies, he contends that Islamic microfinance has the potential to cater to the needs of 
the poor (Ahmed, 2002). Focusing on the inherent characteristics of Islamic MFIs, he argues 
that they have the capability to alleviate common problems faced by conventional MFIs, such 
as providing financial services to those in extreme poverty, and targeting the family as loan 
recipients, as opposed to just women (Ahmed, 2002). Furthermore, Karim et al. (2008) 
conducted a survey spanning 125 institutions in 19 Muslim countries. The researchers found 
that Islamic microfinance providers access only 380,000 clients, with one-third of clients 
residing in Bangladesh alone. In order to reach more people and build sustainable institutions, 
they argue that it is necessary to focus on designing affordable products, training skilled 
administrators and loan officers, and improving operational efficiency (Karim et al., 2008).  In 
this way, it is possible for Islamic microfinance to be a feasible loan product. 
2.4 Islamic Microfinance and Measuring Religion 
Similar to risk preferences, religion is also considered a main determinant of economic 
activity. Examining the link between economics and religion, Ashta (2011) specifies that public 
and private institutions are influenced by religion, subsequently relating them to economic 
interests and activity. Though there is significant research on economics and religion 
individually, few studies specifically observe the link between religion and microfinance. For 
the most part, discussions related to religion and microfinance are limited to Islamic finance, 
with many articles centered on the Middle East and North Africa (Ahmad, 2009; Dusuki, 2008; 
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Seibel, 2008). The majority of these articles contend that religious restrictions are a key 
impediment to loan take-up because conventional loans charge interest rates, which are 
prohibited in Islam (Abdul-Rahman, 2007, Dusuki, 2008, and Karim et al., 2008).  
The aforementioned studies indicate that through the proliferation of Islamic 
microfinance, more individuals will choose to access microcredit. The studies also suggest that 
the main justification for the spread of Islamic microfinance is in order to tap into a more 
religious population. Consequently, this paper attempts to test the assumption that Islamic 
microfinance borrowers have stronger religious beliefs than conventional borrowers. In order 
to test this assumption, it is first important to assess how previous studies have measured 
Islamic religiosity of individuals. 
Albelaikhi’s “Development of a Muslim Religiosity Scale” (1997) attempts to measure 
religiosity through the use of an index. In his study, Albelaikhi’s creates a scale using principal 
component analysis (PCA). Utilizing a questionnaire, the author measured six components of 
Islamic religiosity representing different dimensions of practice, societal value, and belief in 
central tenets. Though the multidimensionality of the participants’ religiosity was generally 
supported, the author concedes that further work is necessary in order to establish 
psychometric robustness. Nevertheless, the author addresses critical issues in religiosity 
studies, such as measuring the belief dimension, offending participants, and gender of 
participants. A significant portion of this research is modeled after Abelaikhi’s method of 
measuring religiosity.  
In addition, the paper most similar to this study is Anderson’s “Multiple Inference and 
Gender Differences in the Effects of Preschool” (2006). Anderson also utilizes an index to 
compress a large number of correlated variables to a smaller number of outcomes; however, the 
subject he explores involves returns to public education investments. Specifically, Anderson 
investigates various measures of life outcomes as a result of early childhood interventions. 
Since each of these interventions measures a variety of potential life outcomes, Anderson uses 
summary index as a method of reducing the total number of tests that are conducted. 
Essentially, a summary index captures the weighted mean of several standardized outcomes. 
The main purpose of reducing the number of tests is to prevent over-testing as well as the 
occurrence of Type I error, which is prevalent when there are multiple outcomes being tested. 
In addition to preventing false positives, Anderson notes that summary indices are sometimes 
even more powerful than individual level tests, where each individual outcome is tested. Since 
both risk and religiosity are measured in this study using a number of survey questions, the 
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summary index method can be applied to this study. In this way, an alternative to PCA is 
provided and it is not necessary to test each of the questions individually.   
Other attempts have been made to measure Islamic religiosity. Many of these studies 
have fallen below adequate psychometric standards and measurement validity. Tessler and 
Nachtwey (1998) utilized a three-item instrument to measure religiosity; however, their 
instrument was solely based on behavior. Furthermore, Al-Sabwah and Abdel-Khalek (2006) 
attempted to measure the importance of religion in one’s life, though their study only used a 
one-item scale. Similarly, Huntington et al. (2001) had shortcomings in that the majority of 
their questions consisted of yes or no answers, drastically limiting the variability of responses. 
Finally, two separate studies used a religiosity measure called the Muslim Attitudes Towards 
Religion Scale (Ghorbani et al., 2002 and Wilde et al., 1997). Though this measure has been 
developed with an Islamic perspective and contains valid psychometric properties, it is argued 
to have a predominantly Shiite perspective that would address only a portion of the Muslim 
population (Jana-Masri et al., 2011). 
2.5 Intersection of Conventional and Islamic Microfinance 
Two studies specifically focus on the intersection of conventional microfinance and 
Islamic microfinance, allowing us to draw preliminary conclusions regarding the differences 
between clients who choose the former versus the latter. Primarily, El-Komi et al. use a game-
theoretic experimental design to test Islamic microfinance products in the context of moral 
hazard and default rates. Specifically, the dependent variable is compliance rates, or the rate at 
which individuals follow the loan terms, with two Islamic-based contracts and one interest-
based contract. In the Islamic-based contracts, solely the borrowers know whether the project 
was successful or not, raising the issue of moral hazard. The authors find that compliance rates 
are higher in the joint venture and profit-sharing (Islamic finance) contracts than in the 
interest-based contract. While this study explores the differences between Islamic and 
conventional microfinance, the study is implemented through an experiment presenting the 
choice between one contract and the other. In contrast, a key advantage of this research is that 
Islamic microfinance is observed in practice, rather than in the context of an experiment.  
In addition to El-Komi et al., El-Gamal et. al (2011) test an alternative Islamic finance 
model against Grameen-style, interest-based microcredit provision. Conducted in Egypt, the 
experiment utilizes Islamically-accepted indigenous rotating savings and credit associations 
(RoSCAs) to compare rates of take-up and repayment through game-theoretic analysis. The 
results significantly show that the Grameen treatment take-up rates were approximately 75%, 
and the RoSCA take-up rates were 91%. Furthermore, the RoSCA treatment was found to have 
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a strong statistical effect on take-up and repayment rates, suggesting that subjects prefer this 
mode of financing compared to conventional microfinance. Again, these authors experimentally 
test the appeal of an Islamically accepted contract, rather than an actual Islamic microfinance 
contract. In contrast, this research observes Islamic microfinance contracts that are utilized in 
practice.  
In all, the literature suggests that several different aspects of Islamic microfinance work 
in favor of its continued implementation in the Middle East, predominantly in order to access a 
broader client base. The primary goal of this paper is to test the proposed rationale that Islamic 
microfinance targets risk averse and religious borrowers. Based on the current literature, there 
is no previous research characterizing conventional and Islamic microfinance borrowers in the 
same setting. The presence of both of these credit markets in Jordan creates a unique situation 
in which this is possible. This information will be vital for a MFI in terms of understanding the 
appeal of Islamic microfinance to a specific population and ultimately determining the demand 
for Islamic microfinance overall. 
3.   Data Description 
3.1 Subjects 
 For this study, field research was carried out in conjunction with the National 
Microfinance Bank of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (NMB) and the Development and 
Employment Fund (DEF). Household data was collected throughout June, July, and August of 
2012. A period of survey collection coincided with the holy month of Ramadan, which is widely 
practiced in Jordan, and is accounted for within the estimations. The sample size consists of 221 
total borrowers with 143 conventional and 78 Islamic borrowers. In addition, a total of nine 
branches were surveyed from both NMB and DEF.  
 Information on conventional borrowers was collected from the National Microfinance 
Bank of Jordan (NMB), a private shareholding nonprofit company. Established in 2006, NMB 
currently has 11 operating branches throughout Jordan. As shown by Figure 1, the branches 
are in the following areas: Karak, Zarqa, Deir Allah, Wehdat, Baqa’a, Salt, Marka, Mafraq, 
Madaba, West Amman, and Irbid. NMB’s primary goal is to increase the productivity of 
entrepreneurs with services targeted towards women and the poor. To meet the needs of their 
clients, NMB offers both conventional and Islamic loan products ranging from 200 to 
25,000JD. Loans are tailored towards specific purposes, including education, home-
improvement, durable goods, health, and business loans. In order to emphasize the role of 
micro borrowers in Jordan, this study mainly focuses on clients who take up conventional 
business loans under 3,500JD (≈$4,940.10). 
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In addition, information on Islamic borrowers was collected in conjunction with the 
Development and Employment Fund (DEF) in Jordan. Established in 1989, DEF currently has 
12 operating branches throughout Jordan. The branches are located in Ajlun, Amman, Aqaba, 
Irbid, Jarash, Karak, Ma’an, Mafraq, Marka, Salt, Tafailah, and Wehdat. In the context of 
microfinance, DEF’s main goal is to promote development by financing small business projects. 
Similar to NMB, DEF also offers both conventional and Islamic loan products, with loan sizes 
ranging from 150 to 3,500JD. Moreover, DEF offers both direct and indirect financial services, 
with an emphasis on rural women empowerment and group lending. This study focuses only on 
Islamic loans offered by DEF, which all fall under the amount of 3,000JD. Though DEF was 
established 17 years prior to NMB, the MFIs both have approximately 30,000 active 
borrowers.  
One disadvantage of comparing clients at these two institutions is the potential for 
heterogeneous differences between the borrowers. In order to minimize these disparities, the 
problem is addressed in two ways. A primary concern is of the eligibility criteria to be as 
similar as possible at the two institutions. Fittingly, the main eligibility requirements at both 
NMB and DEF are the same: the individuals must be of Jordanian nationality, and they must 
have cosigners for their loans. In addition to eligibility requirements, borrowers were randomly 
selected from all but two NMB branches, Mafraq and West Amman, due to limitations of data 
collection at the time of the research. To maintain similarities between the borrowers, only 
common branches between the two MFIs were surveyed. In all, 9 of 11 NMB branches and 5 of 
12 DEF branches were selected for this research. Once the branches were chosen, borrowers 
were randomly selected from the database of conventional borrowers at NMB and Islamic 
borrowers at DEF.  
3. 2 Focus Group and Survey 
 For the purpose of this analysis, the main variables of interest are alternative measures 
of risk preferences and Islamic religiosity. Focus groups and surveys were the main 
instruments utilized to collect this information from borrowers. Focus groups were used to 
amend questions in the survey while surveys were used to obtain information from borrowers. 
Through the use of the focus group, it was possible to attain descriptive feedback from a 
random selection of microfinance clients. Specifically, it was possible to obtain feedback on 
appropriately measuring risk preferences and religiosity from the perspective of native 
Jordanians. Focus groups were conducted at three randomly selected branches by enumerators 
who were trained to supervise and conduct each of the meetings. Acquiring this information 
ensured that microfinance clients would not be offended by the survey questions on religiosity. 
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Focus groups also helped to ensure that both of these potentially sensitive topics were 
approached in an appropriate and thoughtful manner that resulted in an authentic measure of 
risk preferences and Islamic religiosity.  
In addition to the focus group, information was obtained from clients through the use of 
a survey. The main sections comprising the survey include a measurement of individual and 
household characteristics as well as sections for risk preferences and religiosity. The survey 
section on risk preferences explored various aspects of risk and how it may affect the 
borrowers. Specifically, the questions involved the individual’s risk preferences in the context of 
personal life, business decisions, relationships with others, and entrepreneurial decision-
making. Moreover, the focus group assisted in generating questions to measure Islamic 
religiosity. As this is a sensitive topic, each question was thoughtfully created through the help 
of various populations. In addition to focus groups, the research team consulted native 
Jordanians, enumerators, and bank employees in order to attain an appropriate measure of this 
variable. Ultimately, these questions explore religion in the context of daily life, the extent to 
which individuals practice religion, and overall sentiments towards Islamic and non-Islamic 
banking products. 
3.3 Data Summary 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for this study. Within the sample of 221 borrowers, 
65 percent of the respondents took up a conventional microfinance loan, whereas 35 percent 
have taken up an Islamic microfinance loan. Approximately 76 percent of the respondents are 
female. The age distribution of the sample shows that the respondents’ ages range between 20 
and 60 years, with an average of 37 years old. Moreover, the mean age is very similar across 
both conventional and Islamic borrowers. In terms of formal education, a majority of the 
respondents have obtained a level of secondary school or less. Very few respondents have 
obtained an A.A. or B.A./B.S. degree, though Islamic clients boast a slightly higher level of 
education. Figures 1A and 1B further describe the distribution in the levels of education 
between conventional and Islamic borrowers. When looking at education levels as a percentage 
of total borrowers, these graphs reveal that there are no major disparities between conventional 
and Islamic borrowers. For the most part, across the measures of age, education, household 
income, employment status, and business ownership, the borrowers in both subsamples have 
similar characteristics. 
In contrast, Table 1 also displays various dissimilarities between conventional and 
Islamic borrowers. Mainly, a larger portion of female borrowers participate in conventional 
microfinance. Table 1 indicates that female borrowers comprise 93 percent of conventional 
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loans, but only 45 percent of Islamic loans. Similarly, a dummy variable for whether the survey 
took place throughout the month of Ramadan is included, as this could potentially influence the 
responses to questions on religiosity. Whereas 57 percent of conventional borrower surveys 
took place in Ramadan, almost 94 percent of Islamic borrower surveys took place in this time 
period. Similar results hold for whether the interview was conducted over the phone, with all 
Islamic borrowers and the majority of conventional borrowers being surveyed in this way. 
Finally, although loan sizes were capped at 3,500JD for both conventional and Islamic 
borrowers, Islamic loans have a higher average loan value.  
Figures 3A, 3B, 4A, and 4B show the differences between various risk and religiosity 
measures across the two subsamples. Figures 3A and 3B observe the risk and religiosity 
measures obtained through Principal Component Analysis (PCA), whereas Figures 4A and 4B 
display the risk and religiosity measures obtained through summary index. Figure 3A indicates 
that Islamic borrowers have a higher average level of risk for each of the measures, suggesting 
that they are more risk-seeking overall. In contrast, the results for Islamic religiosity are not 
uniform. Figure 3B shows that conventional borrowers have a higher average total for some 
religiosity measures, and Islamic borrowers have a higher average total for other measures. 
This dissimilarity justifies the need for a total measure of religiosity that takes into account 
each of the factors for both conventional and Islamic borrowers, and allows an overall measure 
of this variable. Fortunately, this is possible through the use of summary index. Figure 4A 
explores the risk summary index, indicating that Islamic borrowers have a higher average 
value when compared to conventional borrowers. These are similar to the results of PCA in 
Figure 3A, where Islamic borrowers have a higher average level of risk for each measure. 
When observing the religion summary index, Figure 4B indicates that Islamic borrowers also 
have a higher average value of religion compared to conventional borrowers. Without 
controlling for other factors, these tables initially suggest that Islamic borrowers are more 
risk-seeking and more religious than conventional borrowers. 
Another important perspective to consider is the relationship between risk aversion and 
Islamic religiosity, regardless of whether an individual takes up a conventional or an Islamic 
microfinance loan. The association between risk and Islamic religiosity is addressed in Islamic 
Shari’a law. Specifically, Islamic law prohibits the principle of gharar, or engaging in 
excessively risky activities with uncertainty, such as gambling (Obaidullah, 2008). As a result, 
it is possible to hypothesize that more Islamic individuals tend to be more risk averse. The 
correlations between these concepts are explored using a correlation matrix in Table 2.  The 
results show a generally negative relationship between the risk and religiosity, with 
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approximately 65% of the correlations being negative. These findings also suggest that overall, 
more religious individuals tend to be more risk averse. 
4.   Empirical Strategy 
4.1.1   Principal Components Analysis  
The goal of this research is to analyze the risk preferences and religious characteristics 
of borrowers who choose to take up Islamic microfinance loans as opposed to conventional 
loans. The purpose is to elicit a framework in which it is possible to analyze the demand for 
Islamic microfinance in Muslim communities as well as to determine the risk preferences of 
individuals choosing Islamic microfinance versus conventional microfinance. To obtain 
appropriate measures of risk preferences and Islamic religiosity, principal component analysis 
(PCA) and summary index are utilized. These techniques consolidate the number of questions 
comprising overall risk and Islamic religiosity into a smaller number of variables. 
Consequently, this analysis explores both indices and their results for risk and religiosity 
measures.  
In general, PCA is a type of factor analysis that exposes the latent dimensions of a set of 
variables. Essentially, it reduces a large number of variables to a smaller number of factors. To 
do this, PCA accounts for maximum variance in the data set by identifying linear combinations 
of raw parameters (McDonald, 1998). The first factor accounts for the largest variance in the 
data, and each subsequent factor will account for the next largest variance. These factors, or 
dimensions, are often a combination of two or more items. Therefore, this method results in 
optimal linear reconstruction of the variable being measured using the fewest number of 
parameters (McDonald, 1998.) In addition, PCA extracts a number of factors according to 
different criterion. The default criterion for extracting factors is when the greatest variation, 
measured by Eigenvalues, are greater than 1 (Hamilton, 2008).  
4.1.2 Principal Component Analysis: Risk 
 To measure levels of risk aversion, nine binary risk preference questions were included 
in the survey. Values of 0 are coded for risk-averse responses, and values of 1 are coded for risk-
loving responses. Section 1 of Appendix A shows the PCA results for alternative measures of 
risk. Four factors have Eigenvalues greater than 1, suggesting that these factors account for 
the greatest variation in the data. To estimate the probability of taking up an Islamic loan, 
three factors were retained. These factors measure business risk, personal risk, and 
entrepreneurial risk, and are described in further detail in Section 1 of the Appendix. To 
illustrate the use of PCA, it is possible to examine the factor “personal risk.” This variable is 
comprised of three items: an individual’s preferences when trying new but unproven ideas for a 
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business, the desire to take additional risks when the individual is initially successful, and 
whether it is more important to be cautious or bold overall. Compared to the other risk 
preference questions, the theme of this factor can be described as measuring risk when 
considering one’s personal preferences.  
4.1.2 Principal Component Analysis: Islamic Religiosity 
 In order to obtain an appropriate measure of Islamic religiosity, thirteen items were 
analyzed using PCA. The original item pool consists of various binary indicators of religiosity, 
including beliefs, attitudes, practices, financial preferences, and knowledge. These questions 
were generated with the assistance of native Jordanians, enumerators, focus groups, and MFI 
employees to obtain an authentic measure of Islamic religiosity. Here, values of 0 are coded for 
less religious, and values of 1 are coded for more religious responses. Section 2 of the Appendix 
shows the four factors that are identified with Eigenvalues greater than 1. To estimate the 
probability of taking up an Islamic loan, all four factors are retained. These factors measure 
financial belief, religious practice, religious attitude, and literary knowledge, and each is 
described in further detail in Appendix A. To exemplify the use of PCA, it is possible to explore 
the factor “religious practice”. This factor consists of three items predominantly related to the 
religious practices of individuals. Specifically, this component incorporates whether the 
individual prefers an Islamic or conventional loan, if they believe consulting a sheikh or imam1 
is an ideal way to verify the validity of Islamic loans, and if they seek advice from a sheikh or 
imam on a consistent basis.  
4.2   Multiple Inference and Summary Index 
In addition to PCA, a summary index is constructed as an alternative measure of risk 
preferences and religiosity. The summary index utilized in this research is largely based on a 
paper written in 2006 by Michael Anderson, entitled Multiple Inference and Gender Differences in 
the Effects of Preschool. The idea is to correct for the over-rejection of the null hypothesis that is 
sometimes a result of multiple inference and when there are many outcomes being tested. 
Essentially, if risk preference and religiosity outcomes were tested individually, it is possible 
that some outcomes would display significance even if there were no effect. This occurrence is 
especially likely in smaller samples when there are a large number of outcomes being tested. To 
address this possibility, this study follows the corrections outlined by Anderson (2006). First, a 
specific set of risk and religious outcomes are selected based on their a priori notions of 
relevance and importance. In this way, the degree of over-testing is minimized (Anderson, 
2006). In total, nine risk preference and thirteen religiosity outcomes are utilized in the model.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	   A sheikh or imam is generally understood to be an Islamic leader or scholar, and someone with a thorough 
understanding of the Islamic religion.	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Next, a summary index is constructed for both risk preferences and religiosity. 
Fundamentally, a summary index is the weighted mean of multiple standardized outcomes, 
(Anderson, 2006). In addition to outlining a specific set of outcomes for risk and religion, 
creating a summary index also reduces the total number of tests being conducted in the 
regression. Anderson (2006) states that summary indices present two distinct advantages over 
the testing of individual outcomes. Primarily, summary indices are not prone to Type I error, 
and are actually robust to over-testing. This is because the addition of outcomes to summary 
index will not increase the probability of Type I error (Anderson, 2006). Furthermore, 
summary indices have the potential to be even more powerful than individual tests. While 
multiple outcomes may indicate only marginal significance, aggregating these variables into a 
single index may result in stronger statistical significance overall.   
In general, the goal of summary index is to combine data from multiple measures and 
outcomes into a single index. This consolidates several individual tests into a single test. To do 
this, summary indices utilize weights that are calculated to maximize the amount of 
information that is captured by the index. In essence, outcomes that have high levels of 
correlation between one another receive less weight in the index. The weighting technique is as 
follows: 𝑟!" = ω!" !!"#!  !!"!!"!!∈!!"  
where 𝑟!" is the new indexed variable. This variable represents the mean of the normalized, 
demeaned outcomes for each observation i in area j. To construct 𝑟!" , the outcomes 𝑜!"# are 
weighted by the inverse of the covariance matrix of the outcomes. The row entries are then 
summed in the inverted covariance matrix to obtain the weight on each outcome. In this 
equation, M!" signifies the non-missing outcome total for observation i in area j. Moreover, the 
standard deviation of the group is denoted by 𝜎!" , whereas ω!" is the outcome weight for the 
covariance matrix. For each observation, the weights are normalized such that they sum to one. 
Missing outcomes are ignored in the creation of 𝑟!" . In this way, the new index makes use of all 
available data, in addition to weighting outcomes with fewer missing values more greatly 
(Anderson, 2006).  
4.3   Take-up of Islamic Loans: Linear Probability Model 
 To assess the probability of taking up a conventional or Islamic loan, a linear 
probability model is utilized. In linear probability functions, the dependent variable is a binary 
variable that takes on a zero or one value. For the purpose of this study, the outcome variable is 
the take-up of an Islamic microfinance loan. Since errors are heteroskedastic in the linear 
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probability model, robust standard errors are used with each linear probability estimate. As 
mentioned in the previous sections, PCA and summary index are used to create factors and 
accurately estimate risk and religiosity. Although probit and logit models are commonly used 
in conjunction with probability, they are not frequently used with PCA and summary index 
(Train et al., 1987). Rather, when using PCA or summary index, probit and logit estimation 
methods are not favored due to the variation in the distribution values surrounding the mean, 
which result in asymptotic bias (Train et al., 1987).  Consequently, the results are more robust 
when combining PCA or summary index with a linear probability estimator. In addition, the 
linear probability model is computationally simpler to work with and allows a more 
straightforward interpretation of marginal effects (Heckman, 1985). The model is as follows:  
                                        Yi  =  β0  +  β1Xi  +  β2  Bi  +  β3RPIi  +  β4RIi  +εi                                            (1)    
Here, Yi is a binary variable taking on a value of 1 when the individual has an Islamic 
microfinance loan and 0 otherwise. Xi denotes a vector of individual and household control 
variables, Bi represents a dummy variable for each branch, RPIi denotes a vector of the 
individual’s risk preferences, RIi represents a vector of Islamic religiosity measures, and εi 
signifies the error term. The model is run under four different specifications. The first two 
specifications utilize PCA as a proxy for risk and religiosity factors, and the last two 
specifications utilize summary index as a proxy for risk and religiosity. Through the use of the 
linear probability model, it is possible to test the main hypotheses of this research: 
Hypothesis I: Risk Preferences 
Ho: There is no significant difference between the risk preferences of conventional and 
Islamic microfinance borrowers 
Ha: There is a significant difference between the risk preferences of conventional and 
Islamic microfinance borrowers 
Hypothesis II: Islamic Religiosity 
Ho: There is no significant difference in the levels of Islamic religiosity between 
conventional and Islamic microfinance borrowers 
Ha: There is a significant difference in the levels of Islamic religiosity between 
conventional and Islamic microfinance borrowers 
4.4 Robustness Checks 
 To address potential variables that may be affecting the take-up of Islamic loans or the 
responses to the Islamic religiosity questions, two additional variables are included in the 
controls. The first control that is included is a time preference index. Mainly, because the 
structure of conventional and Islamic microfinance loans differ, the application process also 
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differs. In the Murabaha contract, the MFI must first purchase the goods or product, and then 
sell it back to the borrower at a fixed marked-up price for the service. For this reason, the 
application process for Islamic microfinance loans is lengthier than that of conventional loans. 
To control for this difference, a time preference index is included in the regressions in order to 
measure whether Islamic borrowers are also more patient than conventional borrowers. If 
conventional borrowers are simply more impatient than Islamic borrowers, this could be an 
important reason they choose to take up this type of loan. 
 The second variable that is included in the regression estimates is whether the survey 
took place during the holy month of Ramadan. One reason this variable is included is because 
the majority of Islamic microfinance surveys were conducted in this month. Moreover, the holy 
month of Ramadan is widely practiced in Jordan, and is considered a month for spiritual 
reflection and a time to reconnect to religious beliefs. Accordingly, it is possible that individuals 
who are surveyed during this time period will respond more positively to questions about 
Islamic religiosity than individuals who were not surveyed in this time period. As a result, a 
control is included for whether the survey was conducted in the holy month of Ramadan. 
 It is also important to mention that enumerators are not included as controls in the 
estimations. Enumerator controls are excluded for two reasons. First, when conducting 
surveys, enumerators were assigned to a specific type of borrower survey: either conventional 
or Islamic borrowers. Therefore, their distribution will automatically favor either conventional 
or Islamic borrowers. The second reason enumerators are not included as a control lies in the 
similarities between the enumerators. Specifically, the enumerators were alike in terms of their 
training as well as their personal traits. In order to prevent discrepancies between the survey 
results, enumerators were trained for three weeks prior to field research. Moreover, the 
enumerators were native Jordanians, males, and recent college graduates. With this in mind, it 
is considered unlikely that survey participants will vary their answers according to the 
enumerator who conducted the survey. Rather, it is more likely that any variation captured by 
this variable is due to the differences in the distribution of enumerators across conventional and 
Islamic borrowers. 
5.   Data Analysis and Results 
5.1.1   Principal Component Analysis: Risk 
The results of the linear probability estimations for risk preferences using PCA are 
shown in Table 3. In this estimation, different risk factors are observed for their effect on the 
probability of taking up an Islamic loan, as demonstrated in equation (1). The results show that 
two out of three risk measures demonstrate a positive effect on the probability of taking up an 
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Islamic loan. Although two of the risk measures are positive, none of the values are significant. 
The risk preference measures are still insignificant when adding a dummy variable for whether 
the survey took place in Ramadan. Overall, the table indicates that different measures of risk 
preferences have varying effects on the probability of taking up an Islamic microfinance loan, 
and it is not possible to draw an overall conclusion. 
Despite these results, this model also incorporates various controls related to religiosity 
and socio-economic characteristics. Literary knowledge was used in the estimation as a 
religious control. With all five measures of risk, literary knowledge is found to have a positive, 
significant effect on the probability of taking up an Islamic loan. The results also significantly 
show that female borrowers are approximately 20 percentage points less likely to take up an 
Islamic loan. Table 1 provides an explanation for these findings in particular, where the female 
distribution clearly favors conventional loans. Furthermore, both employment status and 
owning a business are both significant indicators of taking up an Islamic loan. 
5.1.2   Principal Component Analysis: Islamic Religiosity 
 Additionally, Table 4 shows the linear probability estimations with alternative measures 
of Islamic religiosity using PCA. In this estimation, four different measures of religiosity are 
included. Two out of four measures have negative coefficients, while the other two have 
positive coefficients. Also, two out of four measures are significant in these estimations: 
religious practice and literary knowledge. While religious practice has a negative significant 
value, literary knowledge has a positive significant value. In addition, although the directions of 
the coefficients vary, both of these variables are significant at the 5% level. Similar to risk, the 
components of religiosity have varying effects on the probability of taking up of Islamic loans, 
making it difficult to draw an overall conclusion. These results hold when controlling for 
whether the survey was conducted in Ramadan. The only observed change is that religious 
attitude becomes significant at the 10% level. 
 In this estimation, individual and household controls are also utilized. As is expected, 
the results are similar to the previous linear probability estimation. The results show that 
female borrowers have a lower probability of taking up an Islamic loan, again by approximately 
20 percentage points. Each of these values is significant at the 5% level. Moreover, dummy 
variables for Ramadan during the survey are positive and highly significant at the 1% level. 
Again, employment status and owning a business are positive, significant indicators for taking 
up an Islamic loan. 
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5.1.3 Principal Component An Effective Measure? 
 The results of the linear probability model when utilizing PCA are conflicting for both 
risk preference and religiosity measures. Though PCA effectively reduced the number of 
variables that were utilized in the regression, it was not possible to draw an overall conclusion 
from the factors. Instead, different factors had opposite effects, though they were measuring the 
same variable. Therefore, though PCA is advantageous in that it reduces a large number of 
correlated variables to a smaller number of uncorrelated factors and it identifies underlying 
themes of a variable, it may not be the best tool to attain an aggregate measure of risk and 
religiosity. PCA also gives a higher weight to the factors that are most correlated with one 
another, suggesting why the results vary across different factors. In contrast, summary index 
gives a smaller weight to factors that are correlated with one another, since they are being 
measured in multiple ways and are attempting to measure the same thing.  
5.2.1 Summary Index: Risk  
 In this section, three different specifications are observed when using summary index. 
Initially, risk preferences and Islamic religiosity summary indices are observed individually. 
Then, a third table includes risk preferences and Islamic religiosity indices in the same 
estimation. Table 5 shows the results for the risk summary index. For each specification, there 
is a positive value for the coefficient on risk index. However, none of the equations for risk have 
significance, despite including a number of different specifications. These results are similar to 
the risk results using PCA in Table 3, where the coefficients are positive but insignificant. 
From these results, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that Islamic and conventional 
microfinance borrowers have different levels of risk preferences.  
 In addition to measuring the risk index, several controls are included in the regression. 
Similar to the results for PCA, female borrowers are considerably less likely to take up Islamic 
microfinance loans, and this is significant at the 1% level for each specification. The results in 
this table show that female borrowers are on average 40 percentage points less likely to take up 
an Islamic microfinance loan. This is a steep increase from the PCA results, where female 
borrowers were only 20 percentage points less likely to take up an Islamic loan. In addition to 
gender, the results indicate that loan size and whether the interview was conducted over the 
phone are positive and significant for each specification, mostly at the 1% level. Moreover, 
including a control for Ramadan indicates highly significant and positive results. The 
significance for each of these variables is likely due to the distribution in the original sample, 
where the Islamic borrower distribution favors male borrowers, higher loan sizes, phone 
interviews, and the Ramadan time period. When including the controls for time preference, 
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there is little change in the results. In addition, the branch controls do not have any 
significance when the model is fully specified. For the most part, the branch controls also 
maintain the directions of their coefficients throughout the different specifications.  
5.2.2 Summary Index: Islamic Religiosity 
 Additionally, Table 6 shows the results for the religion summary index. For each of the 
five specifications, there is a positive, significant coefficient for the religion index on the 
probability of taking up an Islamic microfinance loan. As more variables are specified, the 
coefficients decrease. Moreover, as more variables are added, the significance of the religion 
index is lower, changing from 5% to 10%. Still, from these results, it is possible to deduce that 
higher levels of Islamic religiosity increase the probability of taking up an Islamic microfinance 
loan by an average of 20 percentage points.  
 These estimations also show comparable results for the control variables. Similar to 
Table 5, females are approximately 40 percentage points less likely to take up an Islamic 
microfinance loan, and this variable is significant at the 1% level for each estimation. In 
addition, the values for loan size and whether the interview was conducted over the phone all 
present similar, positive influences on the probability of taking up an Islamic loan. There are 
also corresponding results when including controls for time preference and Ramadan. The time 
preference index is insignificant, while the dummy variable for Ramadan is significant at the 1% 
level for each estimation. Finally, the dummy variable for each branch show irregular 
significance throughout each specification. Despite these additions, the religion index maintains 
its significance. 
5.2.3 Summary Index: Risk and Islamic Religiosity 
 Table 7 presents the results of the summary index for risk and Islamic religiosity in the 
same estimation. Although Table 5 demonstrates that the risk index is positive but 
insignificant, this variable becomes positive and significant when it is tested in conjunction with 
the religion index. In general, according to these results, the risk index increases the 
probability of taking up an Islamic microfinance loan by approximately 11 percentage points. 
Six of the seven risk index values are significant at the 10% level, with the value for equation 
(6) losing significance. The change in significance occurs through the addition of the risk-
religion interaction term. Nevertheless, the addition of the interaction term in column (7) as 
well as the Ramadan control restores significance to the risk index. Overall, in this table, there 
are uniformly positive results for the risk index on the probability of Islamic loan take-up. 
 Likewise, when the religion index is tested in conjunction with the risk index, the 
results do not change dramatically. Rather, the religion index is robust to different 
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specifications, and maintains a uniformly positive value for each estimation. The values for the 
religion index are significant at the 1% and 5% levels for six out of seven specifications. Again, 
as the equation becomes more specified, the religion index’s coefficient and significance 
decrease. Specifically, the significance is the weakest when including the risk-religion 
interaction term and the dummy variable for Ramadan. Nonetheless, from this table, it is 
possible to conclude that religiosity increases the probability of taking up an Islamic 
microfinance loan by approximately 22 percentage points. This is a similar value to that of 
Table 6, when the risk index was not included in the model. 
 The same individual, household, and branch controls are also included, as in the 
previous estimations. Again, there are similar results across each model specification. Table 7 
shows that females are approximately 40 percentage points less likely to take up an Islamic 
microfinance loan. Contrary to the PCA results, employment status and owning a business are 
not significant in any of these estimations. However, loan size, Ramadan, and the phone dummy 
are all positive and significant in these estimations as well. The effect of the time preference 
index is also insignificant, and the branch controls show irregular significance throughout 
different specifications. 
6. Discussion 
6.1 Risk Preferences 
The linear probability estimations suggest several conclusions: the first is that risk-
seeking individuals have a greater probability of taking up Islamic microfinance loans. These 
results contradict the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the levels of risk preferences 
between Islamic and conventional borrowers. Theory suggests that Islamic microfinance will 
appeal to more risk-averse individuals. This hypothesis stems from the idea that risk is shared 
between the individual and the MFI in an Islamic profit and loss sharing contract. Because risk 
is shared in this situation, the borrower will bear less risk in their endeavor. Despite this claim, 
it can be argued that an Islamic contract can also attract riskier borrowers. As mentioned 
before, the MFI purchases the financial asset for the individual in an Islamic contract. In this 
way, the MFI will have legal claim to the financial asset until the borrower “buys back” the 
asset in installments. Not only does this provide additional collateral for the MFI, but it also 
has the potential to attract riskier borrowers because of how the MFIs deal with default. In 
essence, Islamic MFIs rely on spiritual brotherhood and the idea of mutual help to encourage 
members to repay their loans, or encourage others to assist their counterparts in repaying their 
loans (Ahmed, 2002). Islamic MFIs also rely on the fact that not repaying debt is considered 
sinful according to Islam, which will motivate borrowers to repay their loans (Ahmed, 2002). 
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Since the enforcement mechanisms vary between Islamic and conventional financing, more 
risk-seeking borrowers may be attracted to Islamic financing. Moreover, in terms of risk-
seeking borrowers, this doctrine can also create an opportunity for moral hazard.  
Another possibility of why risk-seeking borrowers select into Islamic microfinance 
considers the idea of credit rationing, and how it plays a role in determining what type of loan 
to obtain. Credit rationing occurs when there is a limited supply of lending to borrowers, even 
if there is a high demand for funds (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). This market failure does not arise 
because credit is too expensive; rather, lenders are already maximizing profits, preventing them 
from loaning more funds or raising the interest rate to attract more borrowers. Some types of 
credit rationing occur when a specific group of borrowers, who share a common trait, are 
unable to obtain credit from a given supply of funds (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). In the context 
of this research, it is possible that risk-loving borrowers may not qualify for conventional loans, 
or that conventional MFIs target female clients. In both of these cases, it is likely that the 
rejected borrower will turn to Islamic financing as an alternative.  
6.2 Islamic Religiosity 
The second and stronger conclusion suggested by the linear probability estimations is 
that more religious individuals are more likely to take up an Islamic loan. This result is not 
especially surprising, as the main justification for the proliferation of Islamic microfinance is to 
provide a method of financing to religious individuals without charging interest rates. Along 
with this idea, an abundance of research argues that Islamic microfinance will intuitively attract 
more religious individuals (Dutta and Magableh, 2004, Abdul Rahman, 2007 and Ashraf, 2010). 
The results confirm the hypothesis that more religious individuals will take up Islamic 
microfinance loans. Still, Islamic microfinance is a novel concept, meaning this hypothesis has 
not previously been tested. Consequently, these results offer a glance at the potential 
relationship between Islamic borrowers and their overall levels of religiosity. Since this 
hypothesis holds empirically, it suggests that Islamic microfinance is another avenue in which 
the poor can access financial services. 
6.3 Gender and Loan Size 
The results also indicate that women are much more likely to take up conventional 
microfinance loans. While there are several possible explanations, one potential motive is that 
MFIs offering conventional loans specifically target women recipients. Indeed, one of the major 
goals of NMB is to reach out to women in particular. On the contrary, the purpose of Islamic 
microfinance loans is arguably more equity-oriented. For instance, a major tenet of Islamic 
financing is social welfare and justice. While women empowerment is a major part of this, the 
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true target of Islamic microfinance is the family, and not just women (Ahmed, 2002; Obaidullah, 
2011). As a result, it is likely easier as well as more acceptable for men to access Islamic 
microfinance loans. 
Across the different estimations, loan size is an important variable when characterizing 
conventional and Islamic microfinance loans. Though loan sizes for both clients were capped at 
3,500JD, the average loan size for Islamic borrowers is 1,455JD, compared to 661JD for 
conventional borrowers. One possible reason for this disparity is the nature of Islamic 
microfinance contracts, particularly in relation to the Murabaha contract that is employed by 
DEF. In this type of contract, the MFI will purchase the asset or goods, and sell them back to 
the borrower at a marked-up cost. In this way, the MFI engages in a profit and risk-sharing 
endeavor with the borrower. Since there are two parties participating, as opposed to just one in 
the conventional microfinance contract, it may encourage the participants to purchase or invest 
in a more expensive item. This is especially likely when both parties have a strong incentive for 
the success of the project, such as with Islamic financing. Overall, larger or more expensive 
investments would consequently lead to a higher average loan size for Islamic borrowers. 
6.4 Principal Component Analysis and Summary Index 
Through this study, it is also possible to draw conclusions regarding the use of indices. 
Principal component analysis (PCA) was initially utilized in conjunction with risk preferences 
and different measures of Islamic religiosity. Although PCA was successful in reducing a large 
number of correlated variables to a smaller number of uncorrelated factors, it presents 
somewhat of a disadvantage when measuring broad ideas. Primarily, since the factors generated 
by PCA had opposing coefficients in the regression estimations, it was not possible to 
determine the overall effect of risk preferences or Islamic religiosity on the take-up of Islamic 
microfinance loans.  
A fundamental difference between PCA and summary index is how these indices assess 
multiple questions measuring the same idea. With PCA, questions addressing the same idea 
will be weighted more highly because they are correlated with one another, and that is how 
each factor is generated. In contrast, summary index does quite the opposite. When there are 
multiple items measuring the same variable, these items will be given a lower weight. In this 
way, the items comprising a variable are balanced, allowing the index to take advantage of all 
the given information. Moreover, a major advantage of summary index is that it ultimately 
results in one variable that be tested in estimations, whereas PCA creates several factors. For 
these reasons, and because the goal of this study is to obtain an overall measure of risk 
preferences and Islamic religiosity, summary index is the preferred measure. 
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6.5 Limitations 
Several limitations are apparent for this study. Primarily, the borrowers are chosen 
from different microfinance institutions in Jordan, and thus do not provide an ideal sample. 
Variations in the distribution of the sub-samples also provide some weaknesses: gender, loan 
size, and survey time period all greatly differ between the samples. This makes it difficult to 
determine causality when testing these factors in the model. Furthermore, since the sample is 
so small, it is not possible to split the sample according to these distributions. For example, it 
would be advantageous to observe those borrowers who were surveyed in Ramadan and 
compare them to borrowers who were not surveyed in Ramadan. Since the sample is already 
limited, conducting these tests yields little statistical power and meaning. In addition, it is 
difficult to interpret several of the variables due to the nature of the project. Specifically, this 
research observes a decision from the past: the take-up of a conventional microfinance loan. In 
the analysis, current variables, such as Ramadan or household income, are used to explain this 
decision. As a result, interpreting the meaning of present variables on a past decision is 
sometimes ambiguous. 
6.6 Conclusion 
In all, this study attempts to measure the socio-economic characteristics of borrowers 
who take up conventional and Islamic microfinance loans. An emphasis is placed on eliciting 
overall risk preferences and Islamic religiosity of borrowers in order to determine if Islamic 
clients embody alternative preferences compared to conventional borrowers. Contrary to 
theory, the results suggest that individuals who take up Islamic microfinance loans tend to have 
more risk-seeking preferences. Moreover, the results also indicate that individuals who take up 
Islamic microfinance loans are more religious. Overall, these findings are generally consistent 
when taking into account different measures of risk preferences and Islamic religiosity. To 
conclude, these preliminary results offer a glance at the relationship between Islamic 
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Individual/HouseholdMean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max T-statistic*
Age 37.7 9.9 20 60 37.8 9.7 20 60 37.4 10.2 21 59 0.26
Gender (female=1) 0.8 0.4 0 1 0.9 0.3 0 1 0.4 0.5 0 1 -9.46***
Education 2.9 1.4 0 7 2.8 1.3 0 7 3.1 1.5 0 6 0.33
Business 0.5 0.5 0 1 0.5 0.5 0 1 0.5 0.5 0 1 0.07
Employment 0.6 0.5 0 1 0.5 0.5 0 1 0.6 0.5 0 1 -1.10
Household Income 414.6 288.4 0 2550 421.6 307.4 0 2550 401.8 251.1 100 1500 0.50
Loan size 941.4 847.1 200 3500 661.0 473.0 200 3500 1455.5 1106.3 500 3500 7.4***
Phone 0.8 0.4 0 1 0.6 0.5 0 1 1 0 1 1 -6.84***
Ramadan 0.7 0.5 0 1 0.6 0.5 0 1 0.9 0.2 0 1 -6.50***
Type of Borrower 
(1=Islamic) 0.35 0.5 0 1
Risk Index 0.01 0.4 -0.8 1.3 -0.02 0.4 -0.8 1.3 0.1 0.4 -0.8 1.1 -1.28
Business Risk 0.3 0.3 0 1 0.2 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 1.0 1.95*
Personal Risk 0.4 0.3 0 1 0.4 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.4 0.3 0.0 1.0 -1.40
Entrepreneurial Risk 0.5 0.3 0 1 0.5 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.3 0.0 1.0 -0.03
Religion Index 0.01 0.3 -0.8 0.98 -0.03 0.3 -0.7 0.9 0.08 0.3 -0.8 0.98 -2.31**
Religious Practice 0.7 0.3 0 1 0.7 0.3 0 1 0.6 0.3 0 1 1.01
Literary Knowledge 0.3 0.2 0 1 0.2 0.3 0 1 0.3 0.2 0 1 -2.8***
Religious Attitude 0.8 0.3 0 1 0.8 0.2 0 1 0.8 0.3 0 1 .27
Financial Attitude 0.4 0.3 0 1 0.4 0.5 0 1 0.4 0.5 0.0 1 -0.75
Religiosity
Total Sample Conventional Islamic
Risk Preferences
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Figure 2A. Levels of Formal Education by Sub-Sample 
 
 




schooling Primary Basic Secondary 
Some 
college A.A. Degree 
B.A./B.S. 
Degree Graduate 
Total Sample 8 11 66 86 26 2 21 1 
Conventional 6 8 43 56 19 1 9 1 

























schooling Primary Basic Secondary 
Some 
college A.A. Degree 
B.A./B.S. 
Degree Graduate 
Total Sample 3.62 4.98 29.86 38.91 11.76 0.9 9.5 0.45 
Conventional 4.2 5.59 30.07 39.16 13.29 0.7 6.29 0.7 
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Risk1 Risk2 Risk3 Risk4 Risk5 Risk6 Risk7 Risk8 Risk9
Religion1 0.0705 -0.0897 -0.0125 -0.2538 -0.0131 -0.0355 -0.1215 0.0174 -0.0006
Religion2 -0.0225 -0.0636 0.0614 0.0495 0.0112 -0.0766 -0.0607 -0.0127 -0.0897
Religion3 -0.1211 -0.0023 -0.146 -0.0341 0.0709 -0.1012 -0.122 0.1251 -0.1747
Religion4 0.1535 0.0156 0.0543 -0.098 0.0175 0.1458 0.04 -0.1819 0.1082
Religion5 -0.1014 -0.1034 -0.0385 -0.0664 0.0385 0.0136 -0.1085 -0.185 -0.0127
Religion6 -0.0382 -0.0619 -0.0767 -0.0758 -0.1702 0.0572 -0.055 -0.0321 0.1173
Religion7 0.0054 0.0126 -0.0755 -0.186 -0.1227 -0.0099 0.0345 0.0912 -0.028
Religion8 0.0341 -0.0544 -0.0644 -0.0875 -0.1664 0.0355 0.0715 0.1137 0.0006
Religion9 -0.1125 -0.0844 -0.242 -0.0506 -0.0053 0.1672 -0.1309 -0.0462 -0.0097
Religion10 0.0245 0.0045 -0.1221 0.0287 -0.1301 -0.0912 0.0059 0.0128 0.0437
Religion11 -0.0173 -0.1384 -0.0044 -0.0125 0.0044 -0.0185 -0.1222 -0.1773 0.119
Religion12 -0.0971 -0.1591 -0.0394 -0.0133 0.0394 -0.0521 -0.0434 -0.1134 0.0127

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Islamic Islamic Islamic Islamic Islamic Islamic
Business Risk 0.146 0.142
(1.57) (1.54)
Personal Risk 0.118 0.131
(1.26) (1.42)
Entrepreneurial Risk -0.058 -0.051
(0.66) (0.58)
Ramadan 0.180 0.188 0.180
(2.66)*** (2.74)*** (2.66)***
Literary Knowledge 0.289 0.309 0.273 0.268 0.289 0.251
(2.49)** (2.59)** (2.32)** (2.31)** (2.42)** (2.14)**
Gender (female=1) -0.188 -0.197 -0.201 -0.189 -0.198 -0.202
(2.14)** (2.23)** (2.21)** (2.13)** (2.22)** (2.20)**
Education 0.026 0.017 0.013 0.021 0.011 0.008
(1.03) (0.67) (0.52) (0.84) (0.45) (0.33)
Age -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004
(0.52) (0.86) (0.96) (0.73) (1.09) (1.18)
Employment 0.098 0.080 0.082 0.096 0.077 0.081
(1.69)* (1.36) (1.43) (1.67)* (1.32) (1.43)
Household head 0.040 0.038 0.031 0.038 0.036 0.029
(0.47) (0.44) (0.35) (0.43) (0.42) (0.33)
Owns Business 0.113 0.112 0.141 0.117 0.116 0.145
(1.70)* (1.68)* (2.12)** (1.78)* (1.75)* (2.18)**
Phone 0.430 0.433 0.451 0.312 0.309 0.332
(5.87)*** (5.94)*** (6.21)*** (3.80)*** (3.70)*** (4.05)***
Log loansize -0.004 -0.004 0.017 -0.004 -0.004 0.016
(0.06) (0.06) (0.27) (0.07) (0.06) (0.25)
Log household income -0.020 -0.003 -0.013 -0.030 -0.013 -0.022
(0.37) (0.05) (0.23) (0.54) (0.23) (0.40)
Constant 0.064 0.025 0.026 0.132 0.086 0.091
(0.13) (0.05) (0.05) (0.26) (0.17) (0.18)
R2 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.28 0.27 0.27
Observations 216 215 217 216 215 217





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Islamic Islamic Islamic Islamic Islamic Islamic Islamic Islamic
Financial Belief -0.02 -0.061
(0.32) (0.92)
Religious Practice -0.208 -0.22
(2.51)** (2.66)***
Religious Attitude -0.105 -0.166
(1.04) (1.68)*
Literary Knowledge 0.253 0.232
(2.16)** (1.98)**
Ramadan 0.218 0.209 0.23 0.184
(2.89)*** (3.32)*** (3.39)*** (2.73)***
Gender (female=1) -0.212 -0.206 -0.219 -0.197 -0.215 -0.206 -0.224 -0.198
(2.28)** (2.23)** (2.37)** (2.16)** (2.30)** (2.22)** (2.42)** (2.15)**
Education 0.023 0.017 0.024 0.02 0.016 0.01 0.017 0.015
(0.92) (0.67) (0.94) (0.79) (0.66) (0.41) (0.68) (0.58)
Age -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004
(0.77) (0.76) (0.75) (1.02) (1.03) (1.04) (1.04) (1.25)
Employment 0.099 0.107 0.102 0.086 0.096 0.104 0.1 0.085
(1.72)* (1.86)* (1.77)* (1.5) (1.68)* (1.85)* (1.77)* (1.5)
Household head 0.019 0.016 0.015 0.026 0.016 0.014 0.01 0.024
(0.22) (0.18) (0.17) (0.3) (0.18) (0.16) (0.12) (0.27)
Owns Business 0.138 0.147 0.132 0.137 0.145 0.152 0.134 0.141
(2.05)** (2.23)** (1.97)* (2.07)** (2.18)** (2.32)** (2.01)** (2.14)**
Phone 0.458 0.456 0.452 0.449 0.319 0.318 0.297 0.328
(6.20)*** (6.25)*** (6.18)*** (6.19)*** (3.77)*** (4.09)*** (3.61)*** (3.98)***
Log loansize 0.01 -0.001 0.005 0.011 0.01 -0.003 0.002 0.01
(0.15) (0.02) (0.08) (0.17) (0.16) (0.04) (0.03) (0.16)
Log household income -0.009 -0.008 -0.004 -0.011 -0.023 -0.02 -0.014 -0.021
(0.16) (0.15) (0.07) (0.19) (0.41) (0.35) (0.25) (0.37)
Constant 0.055 0.243 0.139 0.018 0.146 0.332 0.276 0.088
(0.11) (0.46) (0.27) (0.04) (0.29) (0.64) (0.54) (0.18)
R2 0.25 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.29
Observations 219 219 219 219 219 219 219 219
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Table 5. Linear Probability Regression with Risk Summary Index
 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Branch 2 (Deir Allah) not included 
because of collinearity. Branch 6 (Amman) consists of Wehdat, Marka, and West Amman branches. Loan size 
reported in Jordanian Dinars. Percentile-t method used as a standard error check for asymptotic refinement. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Islamic Islamic Islamic Islamic Islamic Islamic
Risk Index 0.100 0.114 0.064 0.071 0.072 0.074
(0.078) (0.078) (0.063) (0.068) (0.065) (0.068)
Branch 1 = Baqa'a 0.049 0.115 0.029 0.161 0.074
(0.041) (0.122) (0.089) (0.125) (0.097)
Branch 3 = Irbid 0.416*** 0.008 -0.107 0.045 -0.068
(0.085) (0.142) (0.108) (0.144) (0.115)
Branch 4 = Karak 0.379*** 0.093 -0.073 0.152 -0.008
(0.105) (0.151) (0.117) (0.152) (0.125)
Branch 5 = Madaba 0.431*** 0.172 0.058 0.204 0.093
(0.125) (0.167) (0.133) (0.165) (0.135)
Branch 6 = Amman 0.425*** 0.129 0.016 0.165 0.057
(0.070) (0.132) (0.089) (0.133) (0.099)
Branch 7 = Salt 0.038 -0.058 -0.152 -0.150 -0.244**
(0.035) (0.133) (0.096) (0.130) (0.099)
Branch 8 = Zarqa 0.464*** 0.152 0.033 0.190 0.068
(0.084) (0.139) (0.102) (0.140) (0.108)
Gender (female=1) -0.404*** -0.413*** -0.396*** -0.398***
(0.076) (0.079) (0.075) (0.078)
Education -0.050 -0.041 -0.050 -0.043
(0.058) (0.066) (0.054) (0.061)
Age -0.025 -0.027 -0.027 -0.029
(0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021)
Education Squared 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
(0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009)
Age Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log household income -0.035 -0.049 -0.042 -0.054
(0.035) (0.044) (0.035) (0.045)
Log loan size 0.188*** 0.183*** 0.178*** 0.174***
(0.053) (0.052) (0.048) (0.047)
Employment 0.057 0.059 0.065 0.067
(0.053) (0.053) (0.051) (0.051)
Business 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.011
(0.058) (0.060) (0.057) (0.059)
Phone 0.326*** 0.328*** 0.143* 0.151**
(0.065) (0.064) (0.075) (0.075)




Constant 0.348*** -0.033 -0.238 -0.031 -0.152 0.025
(0.033) (0.031) (0.566) (0.597) (0.553) (0.587)
Observations 212 212 212 202 212 202
R-squared 0.008 0.080 0.484 0.485 0.513 0.514
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Table 6. Linear Probability Model with Religion Summary Index 
 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Branch 2 (Deir Allah) not included 
because of collinearity. Branch 6 (Amman) consists of Wehdat, Marka, and West Amman branches. Loan size 
reported in Jordanian Dinars. Percentile-t method used as a standard error check for asymptotic refinement. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Islamic Islamic Islamic Islamic Islamic
Religion Index 0.260** 0.295** 0.194** 0.161* 0.144*
(0.118) (0.117) (0.088) (0.090) (0.084)
Branch 1 = Baqa'a 0.007 0.127 0.188
(0.029) (0.124) (0.127)
Branch 3 = Irbid 0.377*** 0.016 -0.158 0.065
(0.085) (0.138) (0.104) (0.141)
Branch 4 = Karak 0.334*** 0.100 -0.119 0.156
(0.097) (0.147) (0.109) (0.149)
Branch 5 = Madaba 0.434*** 0.187 0.032 0.230
(0.120) (0.163) (0.119) (0.162)
Branch 6 = Amman 0.384*** 0.145 -0.019 0.187
(0.066) (0.128) (0.079) (0.131)
Branch 7 = Salt -0.017 -0.067 -0.205** -0.145
(0.026) (0.127) (0.091) (0.125)
Branch 8 = Zarqa 0.443*** 0.203 0.036 0.240*
(0.087) (0.137) (0.091) (0.138)
Gender (female=1) -0.408*** -0.415*** -0.386***
(0.083) (0.086) (0.081)
Education -0.043 -0.030 -0.053
(0.067) (0.074) (0.061)
Age -0.030 -0.035 -0.026
(0.020) (0.021) (0.020)
Education Squared 0.007 0.006 0.008
(0.010) (0.011) (0.009)
Age Squared 0.000 0.000* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log household income -0.045 -0.079 -0.049
(0.042) (0.052) (0.039)
Log loan size 0.179*** 0.181*** 0.171***
(0.058) (0.057) (0.053)
Employment 0.019 0.015 0.028
(0.052) (0.052) (0.051)
Business -0.004 0.009 -0.005
(0.060) (0.063) (0.060)
Phone 0.296*** 0.305*** 0.108
(0.065) (0.065) (0.066)




Constant 0.330*** -0.011 -0.039 0.337 -0.097
(0.033) (0.020) (0.591) (0.628) (0.570)
Observations 196 196 196 186 196
R-squared 0.027 0.116 0.499 0.499 0.529
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Table 7. Linear Probability Model with Summary Index: Risk and Religion	       
        
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Branch 2 (Deir Allah) not included 
because of collinearity. Branch 6 (Amman) consists of Wehdat, Marka, and West Amman branches. Loan size 
reported in Jordanian Dinars. Percentile-t method used as a check for asymptotic refinement. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES Islamic Islamic Islamic Islamic Islamic Islamic Islamic
Risk Index 0.139* 0.150* 0.111 0.121* 0.113* 0.107 0.121*
(0.079) (0.079) (0.067) (0.072) (0.068) (0.069) (0.073)
Religion Index 0.299** 0.339*** 0.244*** 0.216** 0.193** 0.242** 0.166*
(0.118) (0.119) (0.093) (0.095) (0.089) (0.093) (0.092)
Branch 1 = Baqa'a 0.062 0.176 0.232 0.174
(0.052) (0.139) (0.141) (0.140)
Branch 3 = Irbid 0.408*** 0.043 -0.187* 0.089 0.040 -0.186*
(0.094) (0.153) (0.110) (0.155) (0.155) (0.105)
Branch 4 = Karak 0.340*** 0.092 -0.204* 0.148 0.091 -0.193*
(0.107) (0.159) (0.112) (0.161) (0.160) (0.103)
Branch 5 = Madaba 0.415*** 0.204 -0.018 0.245 0.204 -0.027
(0.131) (0.175) (0.124) (0.173) (0.176) (0.115)
Branch 6 = Amman 0.412*** 0.166 -0.055 0.206 0.163 -0.061
(0.080) (0.142) (0.085) (0.144) (0.146) (0.077)
Branch 7 = Salt 0.017 -0.041 -0.242** -0.132 -0.043 -0.385***
(0.053) (0.144) (0.101) (0.142) (0.146) (0.098)
Branch 8 = Zarqa 0.478*** 0.229 0.007 0.264* 0.225 -0.013
(0.096) (0.150) (0.098) (0.150) (0.153) (0.087)
Gender (female=1) -0.418*** -0.427*** -0.398*** -0.414*** -0.402***
(0.082) (0.084) (0.081) (0.083) (0.084)
Education -0.052 -0.037 -0.062 -0.053 -0.051
(0.069) (0.073) (0.065) (0.069) (0.070)
Age -0.025 -0.028 -0.022 -0.024 -0.024
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Education Squared 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.009
(0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Age Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log household income -0.033 -0.065 -0.041 -0.033 -0.067
(0.042) (0.055) (0.040) (0.043) (0.055)
Log loan size 0.170*** 0.167*** 0.164*** 0.171*** 0.162***
(0.054) (0.050) (0.049) (0.055) (0.046)
Employment 0.005 0.002 0.016 0.003 0.015
(0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.055) (0.054)
Business -0.028 -0.021 -0.027 -0.027 -0.019
(0.061) (0.063) (0.060) (0.061) (0.062)
Phone 0.273*** 0.284*** 0.088 0.274*** 0.102
(0.066) (0.065) (0.069) (0.066) (0.066)




Risk-Religion Interaction -0.047 0.057
(0.219) (0.218)
Constant 0.324*** -0.046 -0.131 0.276 -0.163 -0.147 0.263
(0.033) (0.046) (0.608) (0.631) (0.592) (0.613) (0.628)
Observations 189 189 189 180 189 189 180
R-squared 0.044 0.128 0.495 0.505 0.525 0.495 0.534
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APPENDIX A 
Principal Component Analysis 
 
One aspect of this study explores the various factors generated by the use of principal 
component analysis (PCA). The purpose of PCA is to combine a number of highly correlated 
variables into a smaller number of underlying dimensions or factors. The detailed results are 
presented in this appendix.  
Section 1: Risk Preferences Measures  
 
 Table 8 shows the different components generated when using PCA in conjunction with 
the risk preference questions. It is sometimes contested when to retain a factor or not. In 
general, when the eigenvalue is greater than 1, the factor is retained. Therefore, according to 
Table 8, the first four risk factors would be retained. This idea is further justified by Figure 5, 
which displays the scree graph for this data. The scree graph plots eigenvalues against the 
component number. There is a horizontal line at the point where eigenvalues = 1, marking the 
usual cutoff for retaining principal components and also emphasizing the unimportance of other 
components (Hamilton, 2008). 
 
Table 8. Principal Components Table for Risk Factors 
 
 
Principal components/correlation Number of obs = 212
Number of comp. = 9
Rotation (unrotated = principal) Rho = 1.0000
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
           Comp1 |        2.14579      .978552             0.2384       0.2384
           Comp2 |        1.16724     .0975381            0.1297       0.3681
           Comp3 |         1.0697      .0197047            0.1189       0.4870
           Comp4 |           1.05         .186587              0.1167       0.6036
           Comp5 |        .863413     .0241089            0.0959       0.6996
           Comp6 |        .839304     .0981189            0.0933       0.7928
           Comp7 |        .741185      .141862             0.0824       0.8752
           Comp8 |        .599323     .0752877            0.0666       0.9418
           Comp9 |        .524035            .                     0.0582       1.0000
Trace = 9
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The rotated factor loadings matrix in Table 9 shows a simplified factor structure. In 
essence, this table clearly shows the relationship of each risk question to the new factors 
generated by PCA. The higher the load or the weight of the variable, the more important it is 
in defining that factor’s dimensionality (Hamilton, 2008). For example, Factor 1 is most heavily 
weighted by risk questions 1, 2, and 8. It is possible to use this information to elicit an 
underlying theme for that factor. For the purposes of this research, Factor 4 was eliminated. 
Mainly, the reason for eliminating this factor is because the eigenvalue was the lowest of all 
four factors, and it was only comprised of one risk question. The rotated factor loadings matrix 
also shows a column labeled “uniqueness.” These values explain the portion that is unique to 
the variable, and not shared with the other variables created through PCA (Hamilton, 2008). 

















0 2 4 6 8 10
Number
 95% CI  Eigenvalues
Scree plot of eigenvalues after pca
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Uniqueness
risk1 0.6349 0.2644 -0.1003 0.5169
risk2 0.7334 0.1757 -0.1053 0.4201
risk3 0.1285 0.6472 0.0544 0.5617
risk4 0.1159 0.6135 -0.1153 0.5969
risk5 0.4099 0.0557 -0.5875 0.4838
risk6 0.1223 -0.0054 0.8333 0.2906
risk7 0.0685 0.7576 -0.0183 0.421
risk8 0.7615 -0.0457 0.1982 0.3787
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
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Table 10 shows the three factors and each of the items that comprise the factors. For the 
most part, each of the components are related to one other, and one is usually able to elicit a 
theme among each factor. Using this information, it is possible are able to label the factors as 
personal risk, business risk, and entrepreneurial risk. When using PCA, varimax orthogonal 
rotation is the default setting. This means that each of the factors that are produced are 
orthogonal and uncorrelated to one another (Hamilton, 2008). It is easily observable that there 
is the potential for overlap in terms of the risk questions that comprise each of the factors. This 
sometimes makes it difficult to label the factors as unique from one another. PCA has been 
criticized for being open to interpretability in this regard.  
 
 
Section 2: Islamic Religiosity Measures 
 
Table 11 shows the different components generated when using PCA in conjunction 
with the Islamic religiosity questions. When conducting PCA for religiosity factors, there are 
similar issues as for the risk factors. Again, it is contested as to when a factor should be retained 
or not. The same scale is utilized: when the eigenvalue is greater than 1, the factor is retained. 
Therefore, according to Table 11, the first four risk factors would be retained. This idea is 
further justified by Figure 6, which displays the scree graph for this data. At the horizontal line 
where eigenvalues = 1, four factors have eigenvalues greater than 1, and five factors have 







Personal Risk Business Risk Entrepreneurial Risk
 You need to take risks 
to make money
Try new but unproven 
business ideas
Try new things often
Components Admire people who take risks
Take same risk next 
time if initially 
successful
Start a new business 
based on friend's success
It is better to be risky 
when making important 
business decisions
More important to be 
bold overall
Risk Factors
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The rotated factor loadings matrix in Table 12 displays the simplified factor structure. 
In essence, this table clearly shows the relationship of each religiosity question to the new 
factors generated by PCA. Similar to the risk factors, the higher the load or the weight of the 
variable, the more important it is in defining that factor’s dimensionality. For example, Factor 1 
is most heavily weighted by religion questions 8 and 9. It is possible to use this information to 
elicit an underlying theme for that factor.  
Principal components/correlation Number of obs = 221
Number of comp. = 9
Rotation (unrotated = principal) Rho = 1.0000
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
           Comp1 |      2.05049       .566894             0.2278       0.2278
           Comp2 |       1.4836        .222631             0.1648       0.3927
           Comp3 |      1.26097       .245922             0.1401       0.5328
           Comp4 |      1.01505       .116294             0.1128       0.6456
           Comp5 |      .898753       .116554             0.0999       0.7454
           Comp6 |      .782199       .0899208           0.0869       0.8323
           Comp7 |      .692278       .0961394           0.0769       0.9093
           Comp8 |      .596139        .375616            0.0662       0.9755













0 2 4 6 8 10
Number
Scree plot of eigenvalues after pca
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Table 13 indicates the four factors and each of the items that comprise the factors. The 
results indicate that each of the components are related to one other, and it is possible to elicit a 
theme among each factor. Using this information, it is possible to label the factors as financial 
beliefs, religious practice, religious attitudes, and literary knowledge. With PCA, varimax 
orthogonal rotation is the default setting. This means that each of these factors are orthogonal 
and uncorrelated to one another. Similar to the issue with risk factors, there is the potential for 







Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Uniqueness
religion1 |      0.3692          0.3003          0.1897           0.4679 |      0.5186  
religion2 |      0.2082          0.2016         -0.3578           0.7634 |      0.2053  
religion3 |      0.4611          0.1671         -0.6500          -0.1136 |      0.3240  
religion4 |     -0.3037        -0.0920           0.6521           0.3324 |      0.3636  
religion5 |      0.4764          0.4264          0.2013           -0.2461 |      0.4902  
religion6 |      0.3011           0.5082          0.3528          -0.1116 |      0.5142  
religion7 |      0.2527           0.6140          0.1453          -0.1300 |      0.5212  
religion8 |      0.7738          -0.5075          0.1244          -0.0003 |      0.1283  
religion9 |      0.7654          -0.4918          0.2183           0.0072 |      0.1246  
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
   Financial beliefs Religious Practice Religious Attitudes Literary Knowledge
Against interest rates Prefer Islamic finance Read Qur'an Read Qur'an on a daily 
basis
Components Religious reasons Consult a sheikh to verify validity of a loan
Prefer Islamic schooling Read Qur'an in Ramadan
Seek advice from a 
sheikh
Islamic Religiosity Factors




 To further examine the disparity between gender participation in conventional and 
Islamic microfinance, an index was created using questions on bargaining power. These 
questions explore intra-household decision-making. More specifically, the questions are related 
to decision-making regarding the choice to take out a loan, small and large purchases, and who 
has the final say on household decisions in general. To create the index, the same steps for 
summary index are utilized, taking into account the weighted average of several standardized 
outcomes. In this case, a positive value for the bargaining power index indicates that the 
individual has more bargaining power in the household. The purpose of this index is to obtain 
additional information regarding the differences between males and females who participate in 
microfinance. Moreover, the goal is to see if there are differences in bargaining power across 
conventional and Islamic microfinance, especially since the results uniformly show that women 
are much more likely to participate in conventional microfinance.  
The results for bargaining power are shown in Table 14. From the table, bargaining 
power index does not show any significant effect on the take-up of Islamic microfinance loans. 
When bargaining power is tested only in conjunction with branches, there is some significance. 
When demographic controls are included, however, the significance disappears. In addition, 
there is no change in the coefficient interpretations or level of significance for both the risk and 
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Table 14. Linear Probability Model with Summary Index: Bargaining Power
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Branch 2 (Deir Allah) not included 
because of collinearity. Branch 6 (Amman) consists of Wehdat, Marka, and West Amman branches. Loan size 
reported in Jordanian Dinars. Percentile-t method used as a check for asymptotic refinement.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES Islamic Islamic Islamic Islamic Islamic Islamic Islamic
Risk Index 0.149* 0.163** 0.116* 0.126* 0.116* 0.113 0.123*
(0.078) (0.078) (0.068) (0.073) (0.068) (0.070) (0.073)
Religion Index 0.307** 0.353*** 0.249*** 0.220** 0.197** 0.247** 0.170*
(0.119) (0.121) (0.094) (0.096) (0.090) (0.095) (0.093)
Bargaining Power Index -0.150 -0.190** -0.085 -0.088 -0.049 -0.085 -0.051
(0.098) (0.092) (0.072) (0.073) (0.068) (0.072) (0.069)
Branch 1 = Baqa'a 0.068 0.172 0.228 0.170
(0.076) (0.137) (0.141) (0.139)
Branch 3 = Irbid 0.411*** 0.049 -0.173* 0.091 0.045 -0.178*
(0.095) (0.156) (0.099) (0.157) (0.158) (0.100)
Branch 4 = Karak 0.338*** 0.095 -0.192* 0.147 0.094 -0.186*
(0.105) (0.162) (0.101) (0.163) (0.163) (0.098)
Branch 5 = Madaba 0.415*** 0.209 -0.006 0.246 0.208 -0.019
(0.132) (0.179) (0.119) (0.176) (0.180) (0.114)
Branch 6 = Amman 0.434*** 0.179 -0.035 0.212 0.175 -0.049
(0.082) (0.146) (0.073) (0.147) (0.149) (0.073)
Branch 7 = Salt 0.001 -0.047 -0.243*** -0.133 -0.049 -0.380***
(0.057) (0.146) (0.085) (0.144) (0.147) (0.093)
Branch 8 = Zarqa 0.484*** 0.237 0.021 0.267* 0.232 -0.004
(0.097) (0.153) (0.087) (0.153) (0.156) (0.083)
Gender (female=1) -0.409*** -0.418*** -0.393*** -0.405*** -0.397***
(0.084) (0.087) (0.082) (0.086) (0.086)
Education -0.049 -0.039 -0.060 -0.050 -0.052
(0.069) (0.073) (0.065) (0.069) (0.070)
Age -0.026 -0.029 -0.022 -0.026 -0.025
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Education Squared 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.009
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Age Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log household income -0.034 -0.065 -0.041 -0.034 -0.067
(0.042) (0.055) (0.040) (0.042) (0.054)
Log loan size 0.172*** 0.169*** 0.165*** 0.173*** 0.163***
(0.057) (0.053) (0.051) (0.057) (0.048)
Employment 0.003 -0.001 0.014 0.001 0.013
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.053)
Business -0.021 -0.012 -0.023 -0.020 -0.013
(0.062) (0.064) (0.061) (0.062) (0.064)
Phone 0.266*** 0.277*** 0.090 0.267*** 0.105
(0.065) (0.064) (0.069) (0.065) (0.067)




Risk-Religion Interaction -0.050 0.053
(0.222) (0.219)
Constant 0.321*** -0.056 -0.126 0.270 -0.160 -0.144 0.259
(0.033) (0.047) (0.617) (0.640) (0.599) (0.621) (0.634)
Observations 189 189 189 180 189 189 180
R-squared 0.057 0.148 0.499 0.509 0.526 0.499 0.535
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